The 1998 Spry Memorial Lecture
Dr Peter Dahlgren (University of Lund,
Sweden)
"Public Service Media, Old and New :
Vitalizing a Civic Culture?"
In international
discussions about the media one of the words most often associated with public service
broadcasting is "crisis". Yet in Sweden today, as in other Western European
countries, this is less the case than in the past. Over the last five years or so,
television in Sweden has made significant progress in stabilizing itself, financially and
institutionally. This is gratifying to see. At the same time, the present situation is
hardly characterized by business as usual. While "crisis" may not be on
peoples lips in Sweden to the same degree as in the past, there is still a lingering
sense of uncertainty. At bottom, of course, the questions in Sweden as elsewhere
have to do with the basic raison dętre of public broadcasting: what is its role,
what are its visions today, in an historical context very different from when it was first
conceived and launched?
These fundamental issues are still with
us, and the qualified optimism I report from Sweden is by no means shared internationally.
In Europe the situation is varied (McQuail & Siune, 1998); Michael Tracey (1998), for
example, virtually arrives at an obituary for public service broadcasting. However, at the
end of this wake, he still manages to detect some life in the alleged corpse, and affirms
that we simply cannot bury it. Its importance demands that we find ways to keep it among
the living and to aim it in the right direction. Tracey does a good job of cataloguing the
various impediments to public broadcasting today, and highlights the profound difficulties
of clarifying its mission. Yet this is what we must endeavor to do and continue to
do.
During the difficult years, much of the
debate around public service focused on issues of financing, details of regulation,
proposals for reorganization. These topics were and are clearly of central concern, but
now that in the Swedish context things have settled down to some degree, I feel that it is
opportune to try to go beyond the mere reiteration of classic principles. We need to look
at the public service vision against the backdrop of the current historical juncture. My
presentation here, making use of Swedish horizons, is a contribution to that end.
It is important to keep in mind that the
notion of public service is at bottom a prismatic one: it refracts our vision in slightly
different ways as we turn it and apply it to different issues and concerns. Its meaning
and significance will vary somewhat with the circumstances. I say this to indicate that I
will be taking a particular path here enacting a specific turn of the prism.
My point of departure is the inexorable
link between public service and the democratic character of society. However, I wish to
extend the conventional, largely formal, notions of democracy which have been in
circulation in regard to public service. I want to develop a perspective on democracy
which brings to the fore its cultural dimensions, its anchoring in the practices of
everyday life. This takes me into the realm of civic culture. It is my view that by
expanding our understanding of democracy in this way we can shed more light on the role
and position of public service in a democratic society. In short, if one of the enduring
visions of public service is a democratic society, than one of its tasks must be to
vitalize the civic culture.
I will first briefly review some of the
key features in the evolution of public service television in Sweden and sketch its
present situation, against a brief backdrop of the social and cultural landscape. I then
take up the themes of democracy, civic culture, and citizenship. I then return to public
service television and address the topics of commercialization and popularization, and
their relationship to civic culture. I conclude with some reflections about the impending
developments of digital television and what these may mean for public service.
Making the transition
As in other countries, the advent of commercial television
completely altered the circumstances for public service. There existed a non-commercial
monopoly consisting of two television channels until the late 1980s when satellite
channels began beaming into the country. These channels really had minor impact on viewing
patterns. At this time only a small portion of the population had access to cable systems,
and satellite dishes were quite rare.
One of them, TV3, which was beamed from
London in the Swedish language, did attract a relatively large audience. The major impact
of TV3, however, was to open the door for the idea of a terrestrial commercial channel. In
part the reasoning was that without a national commercial channel, a good deal of
advertising revenue would in the future seep out of the country to such foreign commercial
channels. More important, however, were the ideological arguments. Political parties of
the center and right, as well as industrial and financial interests, were not only
clamoring for a commercial station, but also in many cases attacking the fundamental
premises for public broadcasting. Market forces were evoked as the only justifiable and
feasible way to finance broadcasting. Deregulation was in the air. At this time, Sweden
was caught up in a major turn to the right; the social democrats lost the 1991 election
and a bourgeois coalition came to power. The social democrats did not have a carefully
developed policy on broadcasting and culture and it could be said that they were doing a
lot of improvising on broadcasting issues before they were voted out (only to return three
years later).
In retrospect one may well argue that this
turned out to be not too bad: with a minimum of grand vision and a lot of pragmatic
maneuvering, they paved the way for the introduction of the commercial terrestrial channel
TV4. It was awarded a concession and signed a detailed contract with the state. From the
standpoint of public service, this development has proven to be both positive and very
interesting. There were of course many voices expressing concern and even distaste for the
advent of commercial TV within Sweden. Admittedly, TV4 was somewhat of an enfant terrible
at first: it chalked up a long list of violations against its contract (interrupting films
with commercials, aiming some ads at children, etc.) and some of its journalistic ventures
were quite brash. However, TV4 has matured, even if it still maintains a
popular profile. I will come back to this below.
Thus today, we have a mixed system with
three terrestrial channels: the non-commercial SVT 1 and 2 and the commercial TV4. The
non-commercial channels are now cooperating with each other instead of competing (cf
Hultén, 1997; Edin, 1998). The Swedish language satellite channel TV3 is also part of the
landscape, as of course is the array of other satellite channels, though these channels
have much less reach and still smaller viewerships than the terrestrial channels. The
obvious point of interest here is how the non-commercial channels have adjusted to
commercial competition. Yet another interesting issue is how the major commercial channel
has adjusted to a socio-cultural climate which has been so shaped by the public service
tradition.
Television today
TV4 has been very successful in attracting audiences,
showing a steady increase since its start, which seems now to have reached a plateau. With
a monopoly on national television advertising, TV4 has done very well economically. Like
the two non-commercial channels, TV4 reaches all households in Sweden. Looked at from the
perspective of market shares, the statistics are as follows: SVT1 and SVT2, both hover
around 25 percent, while TV4 has a slight edge with 28 percent; TV3 has 9 percent. Given
the limited dissemination of cable and of satellite dishes, transnational programming does
not have full penetration. TV3, for example, can be seen by only 56 percent of Swedish
households, Eurosport by 46 percent, MTV by 35 percent and CNN by only 20 percent. The
remaining satellite channels have, by comparison, small penetration and even smaller
market shares, hovering around a few percent.
Looking at programming category statistics
for a moment can further fill in the picture. If the three terrestrial channels have a
fairly even share of the viewing public, we should note that this is not a neat reflection
of actual broadcast hours. TV4 has many more transmission hours during an average week:
SVT1 transmits about 70 hours per week, SVT2 about 80 hours, and TV4 115, while TV3 has
about 120 hours (1995 statistics). More program hours, in other words, do not per se
translate into more viewing hours. Looking at programming categories as percents of total
transmission time, we see the following (1996 statistics):
| Content | SVT1 | SVT2 | TV4 | TV3 |
| News | 9 | 19 | 14 | 2 |
| Non-fiction | 35 | 43 | 23 | 16 |
| Fiction | 19 | 20 | 40 | 54 |
| Entertainment | 15 | 8 | 9 | 6 |
| Sports | 5 | 5 | 9 | 4 |
| Children and youth | 16 | 2 | 8 | 19 |
| Other | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
If we take together the
categories of 'news' and 'non-fiction', TV4 has a respectable 37 percent. TV2 is the
'serious channel, with 62 percent news and non-fiction. TV4 has, in terms of hours,
twice the fiction of SVT1 and of SVT2, yet the extent of its news programming lies between
that of the two non-commercial channels. This commercial station has a number of
impressive investigative journalism and discussion programs in its schedule. All this
suggests that one does not attract the largest television audience in Sweden by merely
developing a thoroughly entertainment-oriented profile. The satellite channel TV3 has
chosen that route, but its success is modest in comparison.
Clearly, however, TV4 does have a more
popular profile compared to the non-commercial channels. Here we see the policy dilemmas
faced by the non-commercial channels: given that TV4 has been such a success, how should
the non-commercial channels respond? Indeed, how have they responded? We can emphasize
that the response has not at all been what alarmists had feared. Program statistics
indicate that since 1993 news and non-fiction have actually increased on SVT2, each
category by an impressive 10 percent. Non-fiction has increased on SVT1 somewhat in this
same time span, while fiction has actually decreased. We must conclude here that the
non-commercial channels in fact responded to the commercial challenge in part by increasing
their programming for news and current affairs, solidifying their public service profiles.
And in the process they have managed to retain large audiences.
We can look at another criteria, namely
diversity, which is one of the pillars of public service. Diversity of programming can be
measured within a channel and for a whole television system. Research has shown that the
two non-commercial channels continue to maintain an impressive level of diversity, with
many programs clearly intended for only small segments of the viewing population
even if many of these programs have been relegated to less convenient viewing times. SVT 1
and 2 are clearly doing the best in reflecting the growing heterogeneity of society, with
their emphasis on minority interest programming. TV4s diversity is clearly lower.
Within the context of the whole television system, however, it can be said that TV4s
more broadly popular programming relieves the non-commercial channels of having to pursue
that strategy. A division of labor between the channels has emerged, but without creating
a highly polarized situation.
Thus, the 1990s can be seen as a
period of successful readjustment for Swedens public service television. SVT1 and
SVT2 continue to maintain strong public service profiles, and have even increased their
role as media of news and current affairs. TV4, for its part, has found that a high level
of journalism and non-fiction are part of a successful popular formula.
Popular public service?
The fact that TV4 has a concessions contract with the state
raises some ambiguity about its status. It has to operate within a highly regulated
framework. Part of its revenues are siphoned off to help finance SVT1 and 2. Should TV4 be
seen as a quasi public service? Could a channel such as TV4 be seen as a new
medium of public service, a piece of a larger national puzzle? These questions cannot be
answered with full certitude at the moment; we must wait and see how the situation
develops. However, some critics raise the issue of how TV4s popular formats in the
area of journalism mesh with the traditions of public service. TV4s journalism is by
no means high brow, yet neither is it low brow; it lands in
between. How should we perceive this in the perspective of public service?
As I have argued elsewhere (Dahlgren,
1995) we should avoid knee-jerk negative reactions against journalistic programs with a
popular bent. Popularization certainly can involve the pitfalls of trivialization and
sensationalism, but it can also make news and non-fiction more accessible and more
involving for many viewers. Thus the main news broadcast of TV4 uses an informal style
which tends to make less use of official sources, and emphasizes, for example, the impact
of politics on everyday life rather than the strategic gamesmanship of politics. It
clearly contains less dense information when compared to the news programs of SVT1 and 2.
Yet, I would argue that TV4s news programs more popular formats have an
important role to play in the overall mix: they contribute to a diversity of journalistic
styles within the overall television output in Sweden. They invite involvement for many
people who may well find the news on the non-commercial channels too difficult or too dry.
These viewers may be getting fewer hard facts, but at the same time they are being made
aware of what topics are on the public agenda.
If we look at other kinds of programs
within non-fiction, such as talk shows, we have seen a real explosion in recent years,
even on SVT1 and 2. Some programs on TV4 seem to prioritize spectacular arguments and
inflamed controversy over substantial discussions. Yet, the importance of many of these
programs when they are at their best is that they invite involvement from
citizens; they promote discussion. Also, these talk shows can take up a variety of topics
and experiences that are of importance to people in their everyday lives, such as moral
issues, questions of identity and themes around personal relationships. Just the
visibility of such topics and of people who are concerned about them can, in and of
itself, be a positive force: it accords legitimacy to peoples experiences. While
these particular programs are not always successful as journalistic endeavors, and some
have a short life, it is important for television to remain open to new program formats.
Television must always be looking for new ways to resonate with its viewers.
This includes public service broadcasting.
While it should certainly continue to hold the high ground of traditional, serious
journalism, and there is much to be said for the general division of labor that has
emerged, it must be open to new formats. Journalism formats do evolve on public service
channels, though slowly. Public service needs to consider more the issue of addressing
different segments of the population with different voices, using
complementary and alternative forms of representation in its journalistic endeavors.
The social and cultural landscape
In sum, we have a television situation in Sweden that, in a
global perspective, looks not too bad. Institutionally the dust has settled and the smoke
has cleared - for the moment. The histories of public service within different countries
share many features, but there are of course many national variations. My intent here is
not to export a Swedish model, although I hope some features of our experience
can certainly be of interest abroad. To round out the picture, let me mention a few key
factors about the general social and cultural landscape in which broadcasting is
operating, which will lead me into the topics of democracy and civic culture.
The theme I underscore here will be
familiar, if perhaps somewhat surprising when applied to Sweden (old stereotypes tend to
linger!): social fragmentation. We can locate the dynamics of this chiefly within four
mutually reciprocal domains: economy, politics, ethnicity and what I call cultural choice.
In economic terms, Sweden is an established welfare society, though its welfare has been drastically dismantled it in the past decade. Unemployment figures are stagnating at levels comparable to the 1930s. Class divisions are growing, the mechanisms of global capitalism are increasingly deferred to in the political realm. Our entrance into the European Union has not brought with it the prosperity its promoters promised.
Politically, Sweden is in the process of moving away from the basic corporatist model that has prevailed since the social democrats came to power in the 1930s. In this model, political and civil life was well organized around party affiliation, labor unions, employer associations and classic popular movements such as sports. This model was predicated upon the predictability of political preference and behavior: For example, with centralized wage negotiations and the link between the unions and the social democratic party, votes could be promised and delivered, collective contracts could be signed. Today, party loyalty, class identification, and movement membership are not only less predictable, but also generally declining, especially among the young. They are not drawn to the traditional institutions and the established rhetorical formulations as before. There is an anti-political sentiment among many young people, a distancing from the established political arena.
In regard to ethnicity, Sweden is a society that until recent decades has been very homogeneous. Today some 20 percent of the population has immigrant background. Sweden, like many other countries, has now a mix of dominant, immigrant and indigenous ethnic groups (though the Same, or Lapps, are a very small population). In Malmö in the south, Swedens third largest city, about one third of the population has immigrant background. Like other West European countries, we witness the growth of high-rise ghettos in the suburbs of the cities. In some schools north of Stockholm, the mother tongues of the pupils number over twenty. Value systems and religious views are often much at variance with the dominant culture. Discrimination in the areas of employment and housing is pervasive and well-documented, while at the same time progressive forces throughout society are trying to counter such trends.
From a perspective of cultural choice, Sweden manifests similar patterns of differentiation as in other industrialized nations. While Sweden is coping with a limping economy, it still manifests a very high level of consumption, not least in the area of media technology and products. (For example, the number of cellular phones nearly 300 per 1000 inhabitants - is among the highest in the world). Generally, advanced consumer culture fosters nichification, or even neo-tribalism, as some observers put it, as the pluralization of tastes, interests, and life styles in late modern society accelerates. Production of everything from homes to sneakers is moving away from the standardized and toward the individualized. The media, not least television, both reflect and foster this trend.
It is easy to see how
these domains of economy, politics, ethnicity and culture reinforce each other. The result
is the erosion of the unified and homogeneous national society on which public service was
originally predicated. There is no longer one audience, but many. To this I would add that
since about the mid-1980s one could take the assassination of Prime Minister
Olof Palme in 1986 as a symbolic turning point many Swedes find themselves in
various degrees of what I call domestic cultural shock. They have difficulty
orienting themselves in this period of rapid social transition. The older coordinates are
less helpful today: is Sweden a welfare society? What does social democracy mean today?
One of our sacred cows, our neutrality during both the Second World War and
the Cold War has been revealed to have been profoundly compromised and it now has become
merely an exploded myth. Scandals about Swedens illicit international arms deals,
the endless revelation of national political corruption, the traumas of immigration, the
loss of considerable sovereignty to the European Union, and generally a damaged faith in
the system and in the future, makes many people wonder what Sweden is today
and where it is heading.
Now, I do not cite an inventory such as
this to elicit sympathy from the outside world; in a global comparison Sweden does not
qualify as a hardship case. But the developments I refer to are significant because they
are real and important in the Swedish context: they point to an experiential reality which
shapes the perceptions of its people and the context of the media.
If television has now arrived at what
appears to be a stable situation, there is nothing to suggest that social and cultural
change will simply come to a stop. Indeed, having arrived at this point in the late
1990s, public service television in Sweden must now look ahead to a society that is
in dynamic flux and where economic, political, ethnic and cultural factors will continue
to accentuate fragmentation and differentiation. In this regard, Sweden is certainly
comparable to many other Western societies. The historical present is in transition:
nothing stands still, and public service will have to continue to adapt itself to new
conditions. How will public service define itself? What traditions will it try to pass on,
what modifications will be made interpreting its role?
Democracys horizons: retrieval and renewal
If public service is a prismatic concept, then certainly
one of the angles of refraction must be towards democracy. This is fundamental both for
its legitimation at the societal level and its coherence at the level of daily
organizational practices. We can readily retrieve the notion of democracy via the idea of
universalism embedded within public service. Not only should all citizens have access to
such broadcasting, but the programming should, as far as possible, be aimed at everyone,
in the sense of striving to address the needs and interests of the many different groups
which comprise society. Public service is premised as a right for all members of society,
i.e. for all citizens. Here we have a sort of bedrock, where the principles of public
service interlock with the fundamentals of democracy. This is important, this is basic,
this should be reiterated.
There is a danger, at least at the
rhetorical level, that such reiteration of democracy as a first principle for public
service after a while takes on the character of ritualistic incantation, of a mantra. We
pay lip service to "democracy", which, like motherhood, everyone can
unreservedly support, but after a while loses its evocative power. Perhaps we would be
wise to not over-use the word. Also, the understanding of democracy evoked in such
discussions easily becomes a bit stilted, a bit formalistic; it is a view of democracy
that we learn in the classroom. There is absolutely nothing wrong with classroom
definitions as far as they go, but what I would suggest is that if we are to retrieve from
democracy something that we can find compelling and useful for public service broadcasting
in the context of society today, we need to go further.
I find it a useful entry into the theme of
democracy to make a simple distinction of perspective. On the one hand democracy is seen
as an institutionalized system (the classroom version I referred to above). This view
emphasizes formal and legal dimensions such as the branches of government, elections, and
the participation of citizens in the system. On the other hand, democracy must also be
understood as a form of culture, a civic culture, anchored in everyday life. This
perspective focuses attention on values, norms, practices, and frames of reference. The
first view leans heavily on political science, the second makes extensive use of
contemporary cultural theory and research.
The two perspectives are not in
competition with each other; rather democracy must be understood as an interplay between a
formal system and a civic culture. For democracy to work, both are mutually dependent.
This is a line of argument similar to that proposed by exponents of the civil society
argument (cf.Keane, 1988; Cohen and Arato, 1992). The basic reasoning is that the state
and political system require a cultural domain that reproduces and renews democratic
values, socializing citizens and preparing those who will specifically enter into the
political arena. Civil society, on the other hand, is dependent on the state to guarantee
basic rights and conditions (to free speech, to assembly, as well as socioeconomic
regulation, etc.) which make civil society possible. While the notion of civil society is
beset with conceptual and empirical difficulties, as many have pointed out (cf. Resnick,
1997), these fundamental points about it run parallel my view of civic culture, which I
find to be less theoretically problematic and more helpful here.
The idea of a civic culture points to the
issue of some kind of unity in the face of increasing social fragmentation and
differentiation. Difference as such has been high on the public agenda over the past
decade. It has perhaps found its most vocal articulation as many nations come to
acknowledge and try to come to grips with their multicultural character. All
this clearly puts strains on public service broadcasting. Such situations raise not only
practical issues about how to address national audiences as they become increasingly
heterogeneous while budgets are limited, but also normative ones: what view, which
versions of the national should be fostered? The axes of assimilation and separateness,
inclusion and exclusion, the national and the global, problematize not only the political
system but the notion of the nation state as well. The politics of difference flow into
the practices of public service.
Within political philosophy, these
developments have prompted a renewal of reflection about the nature and goals of democracy
itself. (There is already a large literature here; some key texts are: Taylor and Guttman,
1992; Kymlicka, 1995; Spinner, 1994. See also Favell, 1998, for a handy introduction to
several themes and authors). Without delving into all the issues and perspectives, the
upshot of these endeavors for the present discussion is that they shift the footing away
from some of the traditional assumptions about democracy as a system and more towards its
anchoring in a civic culture.
Civic culture: democracys everyday life
How does public service television foster a civic culture
when the national culture and viewing audiences have become so pluralist? How can it deal
with this tension? First of all, a civic culture does not presuppose homogeneity among its
citizens. Fundamentally, a civic culture exists in peoples shared values and
commitments to democracy, a kind of civic loyalty to the democratic vision (Mouffe, 1993;
Clarke 1996). This means adherence to both the ideals and the procedures of democracy.
This commonality can be manifested by social and cultural groups who are very different
from each other. Civic culture can be exercised and expressed in many different ways.
For television, this means in both
non-fiction and fictional programming there is a need for an even stronger emphasis on the
growing social and cultural heterogeneity. This involves offering images, frames of
reference, and value commitments which reflect a broad panorama of daily life and
experience. It means making visible, giving voice to, and legitimating various groups and
divergent views in terms of democratic themes, accentuating diversity and not trying to
hide contention, where it exists. It means pluralizing the composition and backgrounds of
journalists, editors and producers, a trend that is already developing as production is
increasingly farmed out to smaller, independent production houses.
For example, Sweden is culturally in the
process of moving from an ethnic understanding of Swedishness to a civic one. But it is
difficult for many Swedes to let go of attributes of name, skin color, and speech in
classifying who is and who is not Swedish. Media visibility is very important in this
regard.
Another example: the democratic ideal of
gender equality meets with resistance among certain immigrant groups in Sweden. Who can
say for sure at what point assertion of this ideal by the dominant culture veers into a
form of internal cultural imperialism? Yet it is important that such topics are addressed
in the programming, and in ways which make them relevant for the lives of these groups. In
my view, how we go about resolving such contentions is at least as important as the
resolutions (if any) that we arrive at. A robust civic culture, committed to democracy,
assumes pluralism and conflicts.
At the same time, and in opposition to
this emphasis on diversity, there is also a need for a more tangible sense of community, a
more concrete experience of we-ness. The ideals and commitments to democracy must have a
home in the social world, they cannot merely hover about in our heads. Here we cannot
side-step the idea of the nation as a frame and as the location for civic culture. Public
service broadcasting is inseparable from the national project, but it must adapt, of
course, as the nation historically evolves. The nation is not only internally
multicultural, but it is also porous in relation to global realities. There are much more
transborder flows of all kinds. Yet, even in this late modern world, nationalism remains a
very compelling basis for identity for most people. Public service must continue to help
construct versions of community at the national level, which of course is not to be
confused with the dark sides of nationalism.
We seemingly have a contradiction here
between a plural civic culture and an integrating national setting. The resolution,
hopefully, will be found at the level of peoples identities. One of the hallmarks of
late modern society is the pluralization of our selves. Without getting
tangled up in any postmodern theorizing, we can simply take note that in our daily lives
we operate in a multitude of different 'worlds' or realities; we carry within us different
sets of knowledge, assumptions, rules and roles for different circumstances. Some of these
elements reside more at the core of our identity, others more on the periphery. Yet, all
of us are to varying degrees composite people.
This idea becomes pivotal in the
multicultural setting. Muticulturalism means many cultures, but we should see
this as referring not just to the nation, but to individuals as well. We need to
accentuate and cultivate what Michael Walzer terms our individual hyphenated
selves: as Swedish AND Iranian, Muslim AND British, and so on.
The idea of composite identities also
pertains to citizenship. We are used to thinking of citizenship in relation to the formal,
systemic view of democracy. A citizen is a legal category, with rights and obligations.
Yet, citizenship can also be seen as a dimension of individual identity. One experiences
oneself as a member and potential participant in not only a particular community, but
several. Thus, one can carry an ethnic identity as a Greek-Swede, but also as a citizen of
the Swedish nation and of the Greek community in Sweden. In the role of citizen, the
principles of democracy pertain to ones everyday involvements, be it in ones
neighborhood or in national political issues.
Public service television needs to promote
our various identities: national and particular, citizen and ethnic member. Yet it must do
so in a doubly centripetal manner: it needs to promote loyalty to a democratic civic
culture, and a pluralistic national community. Schematically, I would summarize the tasks
as follows:
To provide a shared communicative space which thematizes democracy at the level of peoples everyday lives. This includes a shared public culture in the media, and the knowledge necessary to understand and participate as citizens what Graham and Davies (1997) term common knowledge.
To ensure what Charles Taylor (1992) has eloquently argued for, namely visibility and recognition of minorities. In a related vein, Michael Walzer (1997) speaks of toleration. If tolerance is an attitude, toleration is the sum of the practices which achieve it.
To ensure cultural boundary-crossing in this communicative space. A pluralistic society does not consist of mutually exclusive groups and communities, but of shifting and overlapping constellations, where the plural is often embodied within the individual, within families. Thus, while public service must attend to the separate communities to the extent possible, it needs also to address and promote the hybrids which are emerging, especially the co-mingling of the national culture with all the particular cultures.
This is admittedly a
tall order, and we would be wise to maintain a realistic grasp of the do-able. Yet it is
important that our ideals point us in a clear direction and challenge us in the process.
As has often been argued (cf Raboy, 1996), the audiences for public service broadcasting
are a public, not a market. This in turn means that public service must treat its viewers
as citizens, not just as audiences. Programming must have an eye to offering significance
and serving peoples lives including the civic culture beyond the site
and circumstances of reception. Public service has, in other words, a catalytic function.
It aims to engender the good society. It can do this not least by enhancing the experience
of citizenship, by touching upon this aspect of peoples' identities and their varied
experiences of community, of belonging - even in the face of a rampant commercial climate.
In this, its goals are different from
commercial broadcasting, where the logic of the market says that merely enticing people to
watch the screen counts as mission accomplished. Robert Putnam, a strong defender of the
civic culture (1993) observes how commercial television in the USA is a factor in the
erosion of a civic culture. Given the sheer number of hours spent in front of the screen,
people are less able to participate in the associations and activities that constitute a
civic culture (1995). In the face of commercial televison, public service will always be
but one set of voices in a larger media environment. It is important to underscore what
these voices can say and do that others cannot or will not: to stress the shared, the
common, but also the divergent, the plural, while underscoring belonging, participation.
Digital developments
The launching of TV4 can be seen, nonetheless, as a
development within the old media order: terrestrial broadcasting has been with
us a good part of this century. There are, of course, newer technological and
institutional developments that already have a sizeable history, such as satellite and
cable transmissions, and there are still newer forms being launched, such as digital
television. Historical circumstances have been such that public service has largely stayed
within the domain of terrestrial broadcasting, leaving cable and satellite for the
commercial market. This is not the case in regard to digital television. Already two of
the worlds most respected public broadcasters, the BBC and Japans NHK, are
involved in the planning and preparation for the advent of and transition to -
digital television. What will this mean for the traditions of public service? What could
it mean for the character of civic culture? Obviously at this point we have no clear
answers, since these will depend to a large extent on how policy in this area is shaped.
The technology of digital television must
be understood as part of a pervasive development in the media industries towards a
convergence toward a common digital language for all text, sound, still- and
moving images media. Broadcasting, telecommunications and computer technologies are
converging; the TV screen and the computer are moving towards each other (though we cannot
say whether they will become one or not). The development of the digital standard, which
is increasingly replacing the analogue, is fundamental for the emergence of what is called
multi-media.
More specifically for television, the
digital technology makes more efficient use of frequency spectrum, being able to compress
about four channels into the same space that analogue broadcasting requires for one
channel, if the same level of definitional quality is maintained. This heralds the
possibility for more programming, more reprise transmissions, more schedule flexibility.
Alternatively, digital television can transmit attractive wide screen visuals,
which take up more frequency space than the older analogue broadcasts. Signals can more
easily be more encoded without reduction in quality for purposes of user payment-based
decoding (subscription channels and pay-per-view). Digital television is shaping up as a
strongly commercial development. The distribution can take place via terrestrial
transmission, cable-TV networks, satellite, the telecom network, as well as the newer
fiber optics cable. The policy issues proliferate.
One of the definitive features of the
digital technology is its capacity for interactivity. In regard to television, this means
more possibility for adaptation to individual preferences: arrangements such as
pay-per-view and delayed broadcast open up the door to more tailor-made output, shaped by
individual audience members. Possibilities for video-on-demand, and the use of
broadcasting companies own archives as video libraries also enhance the options
available for viewers. The interactive domain readily opens up via digital television,
with distance learning games, home shopping and banking, social services, and
Internet-link-ups all quite technically feasible.
At a recent conference, the BBCs
former deputy director-general, Robert Phillis (1997), reaffirmed the BBCs
commitment to the traditional ideals of public service in the digital age. He spoke of new
services being developed: a 24-hour news channel, the use of wide screen for selected
programs, the use of subsidiary transmissions to augment the two main channels, more
educational output. At the same time, he spoke of developing further the BBCs
commercial activities, so that this sector would account for 15 percent of the
companys total income, up from the present 5 percent. This is presented as a way of
further stabilizing the BBCs financial situation. The use of pay-for, themed,
subscription channels, based on drama, life styles, entertainment, etc. is a major part of
the plan. Not surprisingly, some critics (cf. Goodwin, 1997) have argued that the really
motivating principle here is commercial, not public service.
Major media actors Murdoch, Kirch
in Germany, Berlusconi in Italy, and an array of others within several sectors of the
media industries, are positioning themselves. At present, there is a good deal of economic
uncertainty. The basic premise is that people will be willing to pay to have the specific
program they want at a time that they choose, with the strategic use of wide screen
transmissions as an extra pull.
Sheltons (1998) journalistic
overview of this budding industry underscores that this premise cannot be taken for
granted: so far, considerable money has already been lost in digital TV investments. There
are big questions: how many will purchase the digital set-top boxes needed for
analogue TV receivers to make use of digital transmission? At what point should one cease
with analogue transmission entirely and expect or demand that everyone now has fully
digital TV receivers? One can only speculate. Yet a lucrative potential is seen here.
There is a sense of an impending take-off. It is not surprising that public service
broadcasters, who recently had to adapt themselves to a new media landscape in the wake of
deregulation, satellite channels and commercial terrestrial channels, are seriously
thinking about how to respond to the next impending stage of media development.
With digital television we will no doubt
see a further fragmentation of the audience, but at the same time there are real
possibilities for it to further strengthen public service, to serve as a centripetal force
for a pluralistic communicative space and a vehicle for a vitalized civic culture. At the
risk of seemingly looking through a rear-view mirror, I would suggest that digital
television will do this best on the basis of its continuing character as television,
rather than on its resemblance to the interactivity of the personal computer equipped with
a modem.
It is easy to begin fantasizing about the
use of digital television as a way of enhancing communication between the viewer/citizen
and the social world outside his or her home. For along with services and games being made
available, one might speculate that newer forms of civic and political communication might
emerge. From responding to discussion and debate programs, to various forms of opinion
polling, to actual referenda being held: all will be technically possible and no doubt
attempted to various degrees. However, we should be selective with our enthusiasm here.
There is a risk that such practices may foster a form of hyperdemocracy or
push-button democracy, where the speed of the response that is technically
possible may serve to actually undercut that which is so fundamental to a civic culture,
namely real discussion, interaction, reflection. Faster is not always better.
At the same time, I am not too worried
about this use of digital television, since I would wager that it will in the long run
turn out to be a minor aspect of it. It can be helpful here to make a simple distinction
between what I call mild and intense interactivity. Mild interactivity is one
characterized by strategic selection: using digital television to select
favorite programming and at times which are convenient. Intense interactivity is best
illustrated by the chatting of Internet discussion groups. Television is a largely a low
involvement medium, whose entertainment value prevails over other purposes. The odds are
against intense interactivity.
What the digital revolution offers public
service television is an opportunity to do more with the medium, as television. The mild
interactivity of strategic selection will be important: Certainly wide screen will be nice
for some programming, but the possibility of more frequency space, to be used for more
programming, more diversity, more reprises of key programs, less collision between
channels, and video archives, is very promising. The civic culture will be best served by
this expansion of public services capacities.
To realize this potential will necessitate
clear-sighted policy initiatives. In Sweden, the policy discussions have barely begun
(Jonsson and Ulin, 1998 have taken the first step), but it is obvious that policy will
have to explicitly link the realm of information technology with that of broadcasting.
There are major principles, like universalism, involved, and there are major issues, like
financing, to be dealt with. Digital television, like analogue, will consist of a melange
of commercial and non-commercial elements. Perceptions as to what is the ideal mix and the
politically achievable one will certainly vary between countries. Yet it is imperative
that policy making on both the national and international level do their utmost to
strengthen the viability of public service and the vitality of the civic culture in this
transition. There is a lot at stake.
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